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There is a growing literature that investigates the effect of trade liberalization on productivity. Nearly all 
such studies assume that trade policy is determined independently of productivity, hence it is exogenous. I 
show, both theoretically and empirically, that this assumption is not valid in general and that researchers 
may be underestimating the positive effect of liberalization on productivity when they do not account for 
the endogeneity bias. On the theory side, I demonstrate that under a standard political economy model of 
trade protection, productivity directly influences tariffs. Moreover, this productivity-tariff relationship 
partly determines the extent of liberalization across sectors even in the presence of a large exogenous 
unilateral liberalization shock that affects all sectors. The link between productivity and tariffs is 
maintained after I include in my political economy model a learning-by-doing motive of protection, which 
also serves as the source of liberalization. On the empirical side, I examine total factor productivity (TFP) 
estimates obtained at the firm level for Colombia between 1983 and 1998, and find that more productive 
sectors receive more protection within this period. In estimating the effect of productivity on tariffs, I 
control for the endogeneity of the two main right-hand-side variables–the inverse import penetration to 
import demand elasticity ratio and productivity–by employing materials prices, the capital to output ratio, a 
measure of scale economies, and the TFP of the upstream industries as robust instruments. I also account 
for the large trade liberalization between 1990 and 1992, and find that the sectors with a higher productivity 
gain are liberalized less. Finally, I use a system of equations to illustrate that the positive impact of 
liberalization on productivity grows somewhat stronger when corrected for the endogeneity bias. 
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d1I n t r o d u c t i o n
In general, how government policies aﬀect economic outcomes is a crucial issue for both economists
and policymakers. In particular, it is important to know how government trade policies aﬀect
productivity in the economy, hence eventually growth and development. This is a major issue
in development and international trade economics and the interest in this topic is not new. The
papers on this issue date back to the 1950s (e.g. Johnson 1955).1 We recently see an increased
interest in the topic through the ever-growing number of empirical studies testing the eﬀect of
trade liberalization on productivity (e.g. Tybout and Westbrook 1995, Pavcnik 2002, Schor 2004).
Many developing countries (for example, Brazil, Colombia, Chile, India, Mexico, and Turkey)
have aggressively pursued trade liberalization in the late 1980s and the early 1990s, in part, to
boost productivity. So, does trade liberalization really increase productivity? Recent micro-level
empirical ﬁndings indicate that the answer is “Yes.” However nearly all these studies fail to recognize
that trade policy might be endogenous with respect to productivity. And, even if they acknowledge
the existence of this endogeneity, most do not control for it. In this paper, I show, both theoretically
and empirically, that productivity directly aﬀects trade policy. Thus, a concern for the endogeneity
bias is well-founded. Moreover, when we account for the bi-directional causality between trade
policy and productivity, the positive eﬀect of trade reform on productivity may become stronger.
In Section 2, I provide a theoretical model of tariﬀ policy determination for a small open
economy. I show that under a standard political economy setup of protection, the sectoral tariﬀs
depend positively on the industry production (size) and hence, on the sectoral productivity if these
sectors are organized and lobby for protection.2 The intuition for this result is that more productive
sectors have got more to gain from lobbying and the potential to generate more protection. More
speciﬁcally, the marginal beneﬁto fat a r i ﬀ, hence a higher domestic price is greater when it applies
to more units and more productive processes.
In this paper, I focus on the eﬀect of productivity on trade policy due to political economy
motivations as I explain above. However, there are other plausible channels that could actually
lead to more (not less) protection for less productive sectors as I discuss in Section 2. My purpose
1A detailed historical review of the papers that are concerned with the eﬀects of trade on industrial performance
appears in Pack (1988). He suggests that the early evidence is rather mixed.
2This is a modiﬁed result (as I explain later in the text) from the, now standard, political economy models such
as Grossman and Helpman (1994). The results from Grossman and Helpman (1994) have been widely tested and
conﬁrmed. Also Ferreira and Facchini (2005), who ﬁnd that more concentrated sectors receive more protection, share
a similar view with my paper in the sense that the industry characteristics matter for trade policy.
1of using this standard model as the starting point is to create a tractable setup for the eﬀect of
productivity on tariﬀs and then, having accounted for the economy-wide trade reform, to ultimately
obtain structural equations for econometric analysis.
It is often argued that trade reform may be used as an exogenous change and this uniform shift in
policy helps identify the eﬀect of trade policy on productivity without worrying too much about its
endogeneity. In order to account for this argument, I model a unilateral trade liberalization shock
which is common across sectors. I ﬁnd that under such a common exogenous shock, the reduction
in tariﬀs is lower for the sectors that experience a higher productivity gain (or a lower productivity
decline) as compared to the other sectors in the presence of political economy. Initially, I keep the
additional channel simple making sure that it is clearly the political economy consideration that
is driving the results. Next, I give more structure to the extra channel of protection and to the
way the liberalization shock manifests itself by allowing for an infant industry argument.3 This
argument led to the widespread use of import substitution policies in most developing countries
until the mid-1980s and its dismissal was the source of much unilateral trade liberalization since
then.
In my two period model, the government initially believes that there exists a learning-by-doing
(LBD) process and decides about the current tariﬀs by considering both the political economy
eﬀects and the eﬀect of these tariﬀs on future welfare through LBD. In the second period, the
government realizes that LBD does not actually exist and it is a false perception, and thus initi-
ates a trade reform. Given that political economy forces still determine tariﬀs, the extent of the
liberalization diﬀers across sectors (due to political economy) despite this common shock across
sectors. The implication from the models I present is that, assuming cross-sectional diﬀerences in
trade policy to be independent of cross-sectional diﬀerences in productivity is incorrect.
I employ Colombian data for the empirical tests of my theory. Colombia has been used in
various studies (for example, Roberts 1996; Fernandes 2003; Melendez, Seim and Medina 2003)
given that it provides a great natural experiment environment. Colombia experienced a drastic
trade reform in the early 1990s and had a stable economy in this period without major crises.
Given the existence of other studies using the same country, I get the chance to test my predictions
with a comparable dataset. In Section 3, I discuss the trade policy in Colombia during the sample
period of 1983 through 1998, and describe how we can rule out a uniform change in tariﬀsa c r o s s
3For example, the infant industry argument is mentioned as an important motive for protection in Grossman and
Horn (1988).
2sectors.
In Section 4, I brieﬂy review the empirical literature to the extent that it relates to this paper
and then, in Section 5 I make an empirical analysis based on the predictions from my theory using
Colombian data for the 1983-1998 period. I analyze the eﬀect of productivity on trade protection
by following my theory closely. I conﬁrm that the (4-digit ISIC4 level) sectoral tariﬀsa r ei n v e r s e l y
related to the import penetration ratio and import demand elasticity, whereas they are positively
related to total factor productivity. The results also indicate that the sectors with more productivity
gain (or less productivity decline), as compared to the other sectors, are liberalized less.
In the estimations, I account for the extra channels which I mention above and, more speciﬁcally,
I account for their elimination which leads to a big decline in tariﬀs. For this purpose, I allow for
a shift in the common terms across sectors over time. I tackle the potential endogeneity of the
right-hand-side variables, namely the inverse import penetration to import demand elasticity ratio
and productivity, by using instrumental variables. The instruments are the capital to output ratio,
materials prices, a measure of scale economies (value added/number of ﬁrms), and the TFP of the
upstream industries which I conﬁrm to be valid based on a test of overidentifying restrictions and
also explain intuitively in Section 5.
My productivity estimates come from Eslava, Haltiwanger, Kugler and Kugler (2004) and they
are originally calculated at the ﬁrm-level which are then aggregated to the 4-digit ISIC level using
production shares of each ﬁrm. The dataset has the great advantage of using plant level input
and output prices. This enables obtaining good estimates with smaller bias as compared to the
majority of the studies which need to employ non-parametric estimations and sector level price
deﬂators due to lack of data.
By showing how trade policy depends on productivity both theoretically and empirically, I
provide solid evidence for the endogeneity of trade policy with respect to productivity. Finally, in
Section 6, I estimate a system of equations for illustrative purposes. In the system, I correct for
the endogeneity of tariﬀs and show that the positive eﬀect of trade liberalization on productivity
can be underestimated when endogeneity bias is not accounted for.
4International Standard Industrial Classiﬁcation, United Nations.
32T h e o r y
2.1 Basic Model
The output and factor markets are perfectly competitive. The numeraire good, i =0 ,i sp r o -
duced with labor only, using a constant returns to scale process, whereas the non-numeraire goods,
i =1 ,...n, are produced using labor and one sector-speciﬁc factor. The production function for the
non-numeraire goods is Xi(pi)=AiQi(pi),5 where Ai stands for the Hicks-neutral total factor pro-
ductivity (TFP). The international prices for all goods i =0 ,...,N, denoted by pw
i , are normalized
to one. Furthermore, assuming a large enough aggregate supply of labor, the wage rate is also tied
at one—the marginal revenue productivity of labor in the numeraire sector.
The numeraire good is traded freely, hence its domestic price is equal to the world price of one.
The owners of each speciﬁc factor organize into lobbies, and ask for government protection in their
own sector only since they are assumed to constitute a negligible share of the total population.
The consumers cannot overcome the free-rider problem and are not organized as discussed in Olson
(1965). For simpliﬁcation, export subsidies are not allowed and only tariﬀs are available for trade
protection.6 Maintaining the small country assumption and the world prices normalized to 1, the
domestic price of the remaining goods are given by pi =1+τi,w h e r eτi denotes both the speciﬁc
and the advalorem tariﬀ rate.7 The government, then, sets its trade policy by maximizing the
following political support function











where L is the aggregate labor supply and income; Di(τi) is the aggregate demand, Xi(τi)=
AiQi(τi) is the aggregate supply, and Mi(τi)=Di(τi)−AiQi(τi) is the aggregate import demand
for good i.T h u s ,G is a weighted sum of the aggregate consumer and producer suplus, as well as
labor income and tariﬀ revenue.8 The weight, ω ≥ 1, represents the relative importance given to
the producer surplus with respect to the rest of the social welfare.9
5In the estimations I give Qi(pi) more structure. Here, it just indicates part of the production function independent
of productivity.
6The trade with the rest of the world is balanced through movements of the numeraire good.
7Note that the domestic price for a small economy is related to the world price and tariﬀ rates with pi =
(p
w
i +speciﬁct a r i ﬀ )=p
w
i (1+advalorem tariﬀ ) but the assumption that p
w
i =1m a k e st h es p e c i ﬁca n da d v a l o r e m
rates equal under this case.
8The tariﬀ revenue,
PN
i=1 τiMi(.), is fully rebated back to the public in a lump-sum manner.
9This setup can be easily interpreted as a reduced form of a model where lobbying is given micro-foundations
such as in Grossman and Helpman (1994). I prefer to take a shortcut here to keep the focus on the main subject
4Given the additive separability of the government objective, we can obtain the optimal tariﬀ
rate for sector i by maximizing equation (1) with respect to τi. Consequently, the equilibrium
speciﬁc and advalorem tariﬀ rates for sector i are implicitly deﬁned as10




where εi(.) stands for the elasticity of import demand.11 This expression is a standard one obtained
in various political economy models (Helpman 1997). Accordingly, the tariﬀ rate for sector i is an
increasing function of the extra political economy weight provided to producers, whereas it is a
decreasing function of the import demand elasticity, εi, and import penetration ratio, Mi/AiQi.A
tariﬀ is a tax on imports, so just like a tax on a non-traded good, the deadweight loss created is
lower the more inelastic the (import) demand is. Thus, a smaller value of εi allows for higher tariﬀs
to be applied. In addition, a relatively larger market for imports creates a greater price distortion
potential which should be avoided by the government. Finally, the marginal beneﬁto fat a r i ﬀ is
higher when it applies to more units and more productive processes.
Partially and implicitly diﬀerentiating equation (2) with respect to Ai, we obtain the following
relationships between tariﬀ protection and productivity
∂τi
∂Ai










i(τi)+( ω − 1)AiQ0
i(τi)
> 0( 3 b )
I assume that Qi(τi), Di(τi) and hence, Mi(τi) are linear for ease of exposition (i.e. Q00
i(τi)=
D00
i (τi)=0 ) . 12 Although initially ω ≥ 1 is the only restriction on the value of ω, I further assume




i(.) based on the observations from the empirical
political economy literature. For example, Goldberg and Maggi (1999) estimate ω to be equal to
1.014 for the United States, whereas Karacaovali and Lim˜ ao (2005b) estimate it to be between
1.0025 and 1.0039 for the European Union. Although these estimates might be a bit small, they
matter: the trade policy and productivity linkage in the presence of unilateral liberalization.
10Again note that the speciﬁc( ﬁrst term) and advalorem (second term) tariﬀ rates are equivalent since the inter-
national prices are normalized to one. See the appendix (Section A.1) for the derivation of equation (2).




i /Mi,s oi td i ﬀers from the standard deﬁnition
which is evaluated at the domestic price. I account for this in the empirical estimations as explained in the appendix
(Section A.2).
12I have the same assumption throughout the text. This is not a necessary condition for the inequality in equation
(3b) to hold or the other results to follow.






13, then more productivity would call for less protection. Under our political economy
setup, this would be counter-intuitive given that a high ω together with a high Ai only indicate a
stronger lobby and require more protection, not less.
The main result is that, based on a standard political economy model, we expect an organized
sector with higher productivity to receive more protection because it has got more to gain for a
marginal increase in the tariﬀ rate, hence the domestic price level. Thus, this is a slight modiﬁcation
of the size eﬀect identiﬁed by the inﬂuential work of Grossman and Helpman (1994) which has
been tested and conﬁrmed in various papers (like Gawande and Bandyopadhyay 2000, Goldberg
and Maggi 1999, Mitra et al. 2002 and so on). More importantly, this basic observation naturally
raises doubts about the assumption of exogeneity of trade policy with respect to productivity in
the earlier empirical literature.
Before I extend this basic setup by introducing common shocks, I should note that we could
potentially have a channel working in the opposite direction. That is, one can plausibly expect a
less productive sector to obtain more protection. One way to model this is by allowing the political
economy weight to diﬀer across sectors based on certain sectoral characteristics as in Karacaovali
and Lim˜ ao (2005a). For example, a sector with a higher share of employment is likely to have a
higher weight given that it generates more political votes (Caves 1976). Furthermore, sectors with
lower wages may have a higher weight due to the government and society-wide sympathy with their
situation or simply due to the lower opportunity cost of lobbying by the low wage workers (Magee
et al. 1989). Typically, the low wage and labor intensive sectors are less productive so this could
potentially reverse the results. I exclude such concerns from my model because I want to focus
on the eﬀect of productivity on tariﬀs in the presence of a big trade reform shock that aﬀects all
sectors and accounting for further sector characteristics would only complicate this analysis. On
the other hand, I allow for such diﬀerences across sectors that could lead to diﬀerent initial tariﬀ
rates by considering ﬁxed eﬀects in my estimations (Section 5).
2.2 Trade Reform
Nearly all the papers examining the trade reform-productivity linkage involve a period of unilateral




6and common across sectors. Then, the exogeneity of the liberalization shock is used to defend the
argument that we should not be worried about the endogeneity of trade policy. Therefore, I provide
room for a unilateral liberalization motive common across sectors in order to create a similar setup
and analyze its eﬀects. We would like to see whether such a common shock does indeed produce a
proportional, non-selective decline in tariﬀs.
In order to capture this common and exogenous shock argument, I simply augment the baseline
government objective function, G, with an additional term, Σ(τ)=α
PN
i=1 σi(τi). This extra term
does not create a diﬀerent economic structure, that is we still have consumers with quasilinear utility
functions, a constant returns to scale production with no spillovers and so on. The government
objective function can now be expressed as
Γ ≡ G + α
PN
i=1 σi(τi)( 4 )
where G is the same as in equation (1), σi(.)i si n c r e a s i n gi nτi (and concave), and α>0i s
a constant. Σ(τ) is meant to capture the government perceived beneﬁt of using protective trade
policy and would call for protection even in the absence of lobbying. One can think of the perceived
beneﬁt as a government view that favors import substitution or as an unquestioned historical legacy
of trade protectionism. Initially, I use this approach to be able to clearly show that the tariﬀ changes
and levels depend on the productivity changes and levels even under the simplest setup of trade
reform. However, in the next sub-section, I put more structure on the way liberalization manifests
itself by modeling an infant industry argument, which is known to be a crucial protection motive
for developing countries.
The equilibrium tariﬀ rate obtained by maximizing equation (4) is given by14








The ﬁrst part of the expression in equation (5) is essentially the same as equation (2). The
additional σ0
i term, on the other hand, captures the marginal perceived beneﬁto ft a r i ﬀs, again
weighted by imports and import demand elasticity. I assume that the σ0
i terms are identical across
sectors in order to get a uniform eﬀect, that is σ0
i = σ0
j for i 6= j. As I show in the appendix
14The derivation is similar to the one for equation (2), so it is omitted.
7(Section A.1), tariﬀs increase in the coeﬃcient of perceived beneﬁt
dτi
dα
> 0( 6 )
Many developing countries, including Colombia, have gone through signiﬁcant unilateral trade
liberalization in the late 1980s through the early 1990s. As I mention above, it is often argued
that such liberalization episodes can be interpreted as an exogenous shock mostly uniform across
sectors. Thus, empirical researchers regress productivity on tariﬀs by exploiting this variation
over time maintaining an exogeneity assumption. Now, I model such a unilateral liberalization
shock as a dramatic decline in the parameter α, say, all the way down to zero.15 Note that, this
shock is modeled to be common across sectors on purpose and it does not depend on any industry
characteristics. Yet, as we will see below, the political economy motives still aﬀect tariﬀss ot h a t
the reduction in tariﬀs for a sector depends on the change in its level of production or size and
hence, its productivity.














Then, using the linearity of Mi,16 equation (7) can be re-expressed as










The partial eﬀect of Ait on τit is the same as given in equation (3a). Now, we also obtain the















i(.)+( ω − 1)Ait+1Q0
it+1(τit+1)
> 0( 9 b )
Equation (9a) is obtained by implicitly diﬀerentiating the ﬁrst part of equation (5) (speciﬁct a r -
15This change could be due to a contingent loan from the IMF or a policy recommendation from the World
Bank which require certain stabilization and liberalization policies from our “small” country. Or it could be due
to a change in the paradigm having observed the success of other comparable liberalizing countries and a new
international consensus degrading import substitution type of policies. For example, Edwards (1997) analyzes the
role of the World Bank in its eﬀect on trade liberalization reforms and acknowledges its contribution through research
and policy dialogue.








8iﬀ) with respect to Ait whereas, equation (9b) is obtained by implicitly diﬀerentiating ∆τit+1 as
expressed in equation (8) with respect to ∆Ait+1 for given initial levels of τit and Ait.17
We see that a sector with higher productivity is expected to receive more protection and a sector
with a bigger increase (or a lower decline) in productivity is expected to have lower reduction in
tariﬀs despite an exogenous shock common across sectors. Thus, we have reasons to worry about
the endogeneity of tariﬀs with respect to total factor productivity. Accordingly, in the empirical
studies where the sector level productivity is regressed on the sector level tariﬀst h a ta r ea s s u m e d
to be exogenous, there will be a direct reverse causality problem. In the case of the ﬁrm level
productivity being regressed on the sector level tariﬀs, this problem will be smaller. However,
to the extent that the ﬁrm level productivities in a sector diﬀer commonly from the ﬁrm level
productivities in the other sectors or the more correlated the ﬁrm level productivities with the
sector level productivities, the worse the endogeneity will be a problem. In the empirical section I
use productivity estimates obtained at the ﬁrm level that are then aggregated to the sector level
using production shares as weights to arrive at representative productivity values for each sector.
Finally, notice that the productivity-tariﬀ linkage above is completely driven by the political
economy channel. If political economy is not a concern for the determination of tariﬀsf o rag i v e n
sector, that is, if the extra political economy weight is null (ω − 1 = 0), then productivity has no
eﬀect on the tariﬀs. On the other hand, again because of political economy, the reduction in tariﬀs
varies across sectors based on the productivity diﬀerences regardless of the common shock.
2.3 Government Perceived Learning-by-Doing
In this sub-section, I provide more structure for the liberalization process and the government
perceived beneﬁt of protection by introducing an infant industry argument. In developing countries,
learning-by-doing and infant industry arguments have been a major motivation for protection which
should be accounted for. Grossman and Helpman (1995) provide a comprehensive survey of the
literature on technology and trade and indicate that “some countries might wish to use trade or
industrial policies to alter their patterns of specialization... The short-run income loss for such a
country would be small, while the policy would generate a permanent boost to its productivity
growth...” (p. 1297). However, it should be noted that import substitution policies and infant
industry protection have been largely abandoned especially after the 1980s and some critics have
17Naturally, we also have ∂τit/∂Ait > 0a n d∂∆τit+1/∂∆Ait+1 > 0.
9indicated that the infants actually never seem to grow (see, e.g., Krueger and Tuncer 1982). In
this spirit, the trade liberalization episodes in the developing countries can be seen as a result of
the disillusion about the infant industry argument. That is, the governments go from strongly
believing in the argument to understanding that it does not work. I would like to examine the
eﬀe c to fs u c has h i f ti nt h eg o v e r n m e n tb e l i e f so nt h estructure of liberalization. Therefore, I model
a learning-by-doing (LBD) process which is merely a perception by the government.18 Although
there is no LBD, the government believes that there is some and thus sets its tariﬀs accordingly
until it realizes that this is a false perception and then embarks upon a trade reform.
More speciﬁc a l l y ,t h eg o v e r n m e n tb e l i e v e st h a tm o r ep r o d u c t i o nt o d a yh a sap o s i t i v ei m p a c to n
tomorrow’s productivity and hence takes this relationship into account while determining its current
trade policy. On the other hand, the ﬁrms decide about their production by simply reacting to the
prices determined by the government trade policy and their decisions do not depend on any LBD
process. For simplicity, I assume that the government has a two-period policy setting horizon.19
This assumption is not only computationally convenient but also helps us partially capture the real
experience in Colombia20 which I study in the empirical section to follow.
In this setup, I aim to provide a plausible explanation for the way unilateral liberalization
is introduced. The liberalization shock is common across sectors as in the basic model but the
government’s perceived beneﬁt of protection now has a speciﬁc reasoning based on a LBD process.
I model the government objective in equation (1), but now the government has the following
belief about the form of the supply function
Xit(τit)=Ait(φit,λ it)Qit(τit) (10)
Ait(.), like before, denotes the total factor productivity, λit = λ(Xit−1,X it−2,...)r e p r e s e n t st h e
learning-by-doing process, and φit stands for the determinants of TFP that are independent of LBD.
The government believes that λ(.) is an increasing function of the past production within the same
sector, that is λ0(.) > 0. Note that the true supply function is actually Xit(τit)=Ait(φit)Qit(τit).
Each period, the government sets tariﬀs considering their current eﬀects on the weighted social
18Ig r a t e f u l l ya c k n o w l e d g eN u n oL i m ˜ ao for his suggestions here.
19One can think that the government sets trade policy quite infrequently such that tariﬀsa r eﬁrst determined when
the government believes that there exists a strong learning-by-doing process at play and later when this perception
is discarded because productivity gain is not observed or the process reaches its terminal point. Alternatively, this
might be a short lived government that expects to be in power for two periods only.
20This is a feature shared by many other developing countries such as Turkey, Brazil, and India that experienced
signiﬁcant amounts of liberalization around the 1983-1985, 1991-1996, and 1990-1993 periods, respectively.
10welfare as discussed in the previous section but now it additionally considers the perceived future
eﬀects of current tariﬀs via learning-by-doing.
The equilibrium tariﬀsf o rp e r i o dt can be obtained as
ˆ τt ≡ argmax
τ t
[Gt + δEt(Gt+1|ιt)] (11)
where the Gj terms are deﬁned as in equation (1) but with time subscripts and Xit(.)t a k e st h e
form in equation (10). ιt denotes the information set of the government in period t,a n dδ<1
is the time discount factor. At period t the government knows that TFP has some baseline value
Ait(.)=φit and believes that the future expected TFP is given by Et(Ait+1(.)) = Et(φit+1λit+1)=
φit+1λ(φitQit).21
Solving backwards, we obtain the tariﬀsf o rp e r i o dt+1. The realized values of these tariﬀsa r e
set after the government observes Ait+1 and ﬁnds out that there is actually no LBD. Therefore,
the actual period t +1t a r iﬀ rate is equal in its form and value to the one in equation (2). On the
other hand, in order to determine the tariﬀss e ti np e r i o dt, the government needs to compute the
future expected welfare which depends on the expected period t +1t a r i ﬀs. Given that there are
two periods, the expected tariﬀsf o rp e r i o dt + 1 have the standard form similar to equation (2);
however, due to the LBD process, each of its components, hence itself is expected to depend on
period t tariﬀs
Et(τit+1)=τe




As I show in Section A.1 in the appendix, the equilibrium tariﬀ rate for period t is obtained
from equation (11) such that the tariﬀs now include the perceived learning-by-doing motive in
addition to the political economy channel.

















φit+1λ(φitQit)Qit+1dτit+1 > 0 (14)
21Note that the government is not taking expected values over alternative values of φit+1.I n s t e a di te x p e c t sφit+1
to be equal to φit+1 with probability 1.
11Thus, Λi measures the government perceived growth in productivity due to the LBD process
multiplied by the responsiveness of the current supply to tariﬀs and weighted by the future producer
surplus. The tariﬀ rate is increasing in the additional LBD term since the government considers
the positive eﬀect of increased production through today’s protection on tomorrow’s welfare.
Let’s consider the following functional form for the LBD process22
λit+1 = λ(Xi(τit)) = [φitQi(τit)]n, n<1 (15)
Next, in order to see the eﬀect of productivity on tariﬀs, we plug equation (15) in equation (13) and,










Thus, assuming that φit, the part of the government perceived productivity that is independent
of the LBD process, and φit+1, its future expected value, are positively correlated with the actual
underlying determinants of TFP, the tariﬀ rate increases in the current and expected future pro-
ductivity. This might be one of the reasons why we need to worry about using lagged tariﬀ rates
as a way to get around the endogeneity problem while regressing productivity on tariﬀs. More im-
portantly, the positive eﬀect of productivity on tariﬀsc o n ﬁrms the main result in my basic model
in this richer setup.
Next, I also conﬁrm that the change in tariﬀs is positively related to the change in productivity
as in the previous section23
d∆τit+1
d∆φit+1
|τit,φit > 0 (17)
We see that, introducing a government perceived LBD process adds a new channel of protection
and a structure for the onset of the unilateral trade liberalization. However, the productivity to
tariﬀ linkages, as established in the basic political economy model, prevail.
22Ia s s u m eλ(.) is concave. Otherwise, in the multi-period case, tariﬀs could be raised unboundedly which is quite
unrealistic.
23Apart from the supposedly temporary nature of protection due to the infant industry argument, I assume that
in period t+1 the government actually realizes that the LBD process is not working. See the appendix (Section A.1)
for the derivation.
12As a ﬁnal note, I acknowledge that in several empirical studies, declining industries such as
textiles, clothing, footwear, and steel receive more protection in industrialized nations. Therefore,
these studies naturally look at developed countries and especially the United States for evidence (see
for example Baldwin 1985, and Marvel and Ray 1983). On the theory side, two recent papers that
build up on Grossman and Helpman (1994) are worth noting: Baldwin (2002) uses a monopolistic
competition model with sunk entry costs and random Markov process demand shocks; whereas,
Tovar (2004) introduces loss aversion in preferences. One implication from these papers is that
less productive sectors could receive more protection. However, none of the models on declining
industries speciﬁcally account for unilateral liberalization or focus on establishing a link from
productivity to trade policy. The models I presented in this and previous sections intend to show
this link in the presence of unilateral liberalization which is taken to be an exogenous shock and
hence used as the working assumption to identify the eﬀects of tariﬀs on productivity in the
earlier literature. Yet, the common denominator of my models and implications from these is that
productivity matters for trade policy. Thus, how productivity speciﬁcally aﬀects tariﬀs needs to
be tested and documented empirically as I do in Section 5.
3 Trade Policy in Colombia
Colombia is a perfect example of a developing country that went through phases of heavy trade
protection prior to the mid-1980s and ﬁnally a dramatic unilateral trade liberalization in the early
1990s, as can be seen in Figure 1. Therefore, it is no surprise that Colombia has been used as the
case study of several papers to examine the impact of trade reform on productivity (for example,
Roberts 1996; Fernandes 2003; Melendez, Seim and Medina 2003).
The barriers were ﬁrst lowered during the 1977-1981 period in response to an increase in the
coﬀee prices, increased foreign borrowing, and drug traﬃcking (Fernandes 2003). On the other
hand, the Latin American debt crisis and the worsening terms of trade led to an increase in
protection in the ﬁrst half of the 1980s (Edwards 2001). President Virgilio Barco Vargas started
the initial movement towards a real trade reform after he took oﬃce in 1986. He was succeeded by
President Cesar Gaviria who completed the trade reform swiftly in two years (1991 and 1992).
As I mentioned above, nearly all studies in the trade reform and productivity literature neglect
the endogeneity of trade policy. Although some authors (e.g., Pavcnik 2002 for Chile; Ferreira
and Rossi 2003 for Brazil) acknowledge the potential for endogeneity, they argue that it may not
13be such an issue in their studies given that the tariﬀs were reduced uniformly or proportionally
across sectors. This is not true at least for Colombia; the liberalization was not uniform. Edwards
(2001) notes that the trade liberalization reform of Colombia (“La Apertura”) was “announced
during the presidential campaign [of Cesar Gaviria] as a ‘gradual’ and ‘selective’ process.” As
can be observed from Figures 2 through 4, there is quite some variation in the tariﬀ reductions
across sectors.24 Moreover, the Spearman’s rank correlations of tariﬀs in Table 1 indicate that
the correlations reduced over time, implying a selective process as opposed to a uniform one in
liberalization. Otherwise, the ranking of sectors in terms of their protection rate would not change.
The average advalorem tariﬀ rates in my sample of 4-digit ISIC industries declined from 43%
in 1983 to about 14% in 1992 and stayed around that rate in the following years (Table 2). The
dispersion of tariﬀs across sectors also declined (Table 2). If we just look at the standard deviations,
the decline appears to be markedly higher. However, we need to take into account the diﬀerences
in the magnitude of tariﬀs across periods and the coeﬃcient of variation25 is a better measure
for that matter. The decline in the dispersion is notably lower when we use the coeﬃcient of
variation. However, this outcome does not indicate that political economy is no more a factor in
tariﬀs after reform. The decrease in the dispersion is predicted by my models given the fact that
the liberalization occurs through the elimination of some extra channels other than the political
economy channel.
In my theoretical models and the main estimations, I use tariﬀ rates as a measure of protection
for import-competing sectors. I also have access to eﬀective rate of protection (ERP) data which I
use to augment my results with tariﬀs. The eﬀective rates take into account the tariﬀs on inputs,
and they are based on the value added. They are considerably higher than the nominal rates but
show a similar pattern with the tariﬀs as can be observed from Figure 1.
Before I discuss my empirical methodology and the results, in the next section I brieﬂyr e v i e w
the existing empirical literature to the extent that it relates to this paper.
4 Empirical Literature Overview
Tybout (1991) brieﬂy reviews the literature that contains implications for the linkages between
trade and productivity, and he indicates that the net eﬀect of a liberalization episode is ambiguous.
24Note that the reductions are computed as percentages to account for the variation in the initial tariﬀs.
25Coeﬃcient of variation is the mean divided by the standard deviation of a given group.
14Therefore, a majority of the studies that appear in the last decade remain empirical and do not
test any particular theory.26,27
Nearly all researchers take a two-step approach, where they ﬁrst estimate productivity usually
at the ﬁrm level (and some at the sector level), and then regress this productivity estimate on
trade policy measures such as import penetration or tariﬀs for a single country (e.g., Fernandes
2003, Schor 2004, and Tybout and Westbrook 1995). Another strand of the literature focuses on
the eﬀect of imperfect competition in estimation and seeks to analyze the change in the price-cost
margins after liberalization (Harrison 1994, Krishna and Mitra 1998 and so on).28
Although nearly all the studies neglect the endogeneity issue, Fernandes (2003) is an exception.
She controls for endogeneity by using lagged tariﬀ rates instead of current ones. She also consid-
e r st h ev a r i a b l e sf r o mT r e ﬂer’s (1993) non-tariﬀ barrier (NTB) equation as instruments for tariﬀ
rates in a robustness check. However, using lagged tariﬀ rates might not get around the endogene-
ity problem, because trade policy might diﬀer across sectors due to persistent factors related to
productivity. For instance, productivity might be autocorrelated, or tariﬀsm a yb ei n ﬂuenced by
anticipated changes in productivity as predicted by one of my theoretical results. What is more,
the validity of the instruments initially used by Treﬂer (1993) for a diﬀerent study is debatable
since some of the instruments (like import penetration or regional concentration) could very well
be inﬂuenced by productivity, and hence be endogenous themselves.29 Muendler (2004) is another
exception in trying to control for the endogeneity of trade policy. He regresses the growth rate
of productivity on both tariﬀs and import penetration at the same time. He considers certain
components of the real exchange rate as instruments for the trade policy measures.30 However,
26The motivation for the micro-level liberalization impact studies is based on two basic conjectures. First, trade
liberalization may produce a productivity growth for the ﬁrm and the industry through economies of scale, improved
access to foreign technology, and the elimination of X-ineﬃciencies. Second, liberalization may reallocate resources
from the less eﬃcient to the more eﬃcient ﬁr m sa f t e rt h el e s se ﬃcient ones exit, hence provide a rise in the average
productivity.
27There are also ex-post theoretical studies that provide an explanation for some of the results found in the recent
empirical research. For example, in an inﬂuential paper, Melitz (2003) shows how industry productivity may grow
due to reallocation between ﬁrms after an exogenous trade reform shock.
28In this paper, I focus on the single-country micro studies and relate my results directly to these. However, there
is also a related group of empirical papers where authors analyze cross-country growth regressions (as summarized
in Harrison 1996) linking openness to output growth. Such studies miss the micro variation, which is crucial in
distinguishing among various channels of productivity changes, in the data. A recent criticism of these studies
appears in Rodriguez and Rodrik (2001) who are in turn criticized by Srinivasan and Bhagwati (2001).
29Fernandes (2003) acknowledges that these robustness results are not reliable, as some of her instruments are
clearly correlated with productivity.
30The measures are the nominal US dollar exchange rate, the average sector-speciﬁc European and US-Canadian
producer price indices, and the Brazilian consumer price index. Muendler (2004) recognizes that the domestic prices
can be correlated with the productivity of the ﬁrms so does not consider this as one of his baseline instruments but
rather keeps it as a component of the real exchange rate.
15both the nominal and real exchange rates lack sectoral variation and cannot explain why tariﬀ
rates diﬀer across sectors.31
Harrison (1994) uses time dummies for capturing trade liberalization but these do not account
for the ﬁrm/industry level variation in policy. She also considers tariﬀ changes and import penetra-
tion in her estimations by interacting the trade policy measures with the relevant mark-up variable.
These estimations invariably suﬀer from the same endogeneity problems I discussed above.
Pavcnik (2002) takes yet another approach and compares the productivity changes in the trad-
able versus non-tradable sectors around a trade liberalization period, ﬁnding that the import sectors
experienced a larger increase in productivity relative to the non-tradable sectors but the results
are inconclusive for export-oriented sectors.32 This methodology does not account for the sectoral
variations in trade policy as well. Furthermore, Tybout (1996) notes that ﬁrms usually self-select
their trade-orientation and if more productive ﬁrms are more likely to become an exporter, then
one must use caution in asserting a casual relationship from policy to performance. Pavcnik (2002)
also regresses productivity on tariﬀs and import penetration as a robustness check, and she does
not control for the endogeneity of trade policy.
Next, I would like to test my theory which predicts that tariﬀs depend on productivity, and
liberalization diﬀers across sectors based on productivity changes despite a common exogenous
shock.
5E s t i m a t i o n
5.1 Econometric Model
In the theory section I present two similar models of tariﬀ policy where political economy is the
common determinant. Moreover, the government has some positive perception about using tariﬀs
which serves as the extra channel for protection. Both models imply protection even in the absence
of political economy. A large negative shock, which is common across sectors, appears through these
channels and serves as the source of trade liberalization.
In the estimations, I intend to capture the common features of protection and liberalization
31Note that, I show in my theoretical model and the corresponding estimations that tariﬀs directly depend on
import penetration as well as import penetration depends on tariﬀsi nas y s t e m a t i cw a ys ot h i sm i g h tf u r t h e rc r e a t e
multicollinearity problems in Muendler’s (2004) estimations.
32Ozler and Yilmaz (2003) use the same approach to analyze the eﬀect of trade liberalization on productivity in
Turkey.
16implied by my models. According to the political economy channel, tariﬀs are inversely related
to import penetration (that is Imports/Domestic Production) and import demand elasticity. Re-
call that the production function is denoted as Xit = AitQit where Ait stands for total factor
productivity (TFP) and we have the following deﬁnition: Inverse Import Penetration/Import De-
mand Elasticity=
AitQit/Mit
εit . The additional source of tariﬀ protection causes a major unilateral
liberalization when it vanishes. This occurs after the paradigm changes as discussed in Section 2.2,
or after learning-by-doing is realized to be a false perception as in Section 2.3. I model the addi-
tional channels of protection under both models with a combination of overall and sector speciﬁc
constants. Then, the trade reform that occurs due to the disappearance of such motives is a shift
in the intercept terms (constants) of the tariﬀ determination rule. Given the parsimonious nature
of the models, the sector-speciﬁce ﬀects also help to control for the other determinants of tariﬀs
that may not be considered already.
As illustrated in Figure 1, tariﬀs in Colombia declined drastically starting in 1990 and the
liberalization continued until 1992. Based on the theory, I ﬁrst start out by assuming that liberal-
ization is a major, once and for all shift in tariﬀs and relax this assumption afterwards. I capture
the shift with a dummy variable, UNILIBt, that takes the value one for 1990 and onwards, and
zero otherwise. The econometric model can then be expressed as
logτit = α + β1 log(Qit/Mitεit)+β2 logAit + β3UNILIBt + µiβ4 + uit (18)
where τit is the advalorem tariﬀ rate for sector i =1 ,...,N at period t =1 ,...,T. Note that the
eﬀect of Ait (TFP) on tariﬀs is taken in isolation with the use of logarithms. Qit/Mitεit, together
with Ait, are measures of the main political economy channel.33 µi is a 1×(N−1) vector of industry
dummy variables and depicts sector-speciﬁce ﬀects. UNILIBt serves as an intercept-shifter with
the interpretation I described above. According to the theory, we expect positive estimates of β1
and β2. On the other hand, the estimate of β3 should be naturally negative by deﬁnition (it is a
unilateral liberalization).34
In the theory section, the liberalization shock results in a one time permanent decline in tariﬀs
although it is not necessarily how a real reform progresses. By looking at Figure 1, we can distin-
guish three periods with plausibly three diﬀerent intercept terms: 1983-1989 (pre-reform), 1990-1992
33Qit is not directly observable but it is estimated by dividing Xit by the estimate of Ait.
34α, β1, β2,a n dβ3 are scalars, whereas β4 is an (N − 1) × 1v e c t o ro fc o e ﬃcients.
17(reform), and 1993-1998 (post-reform). What is more, there exists considerable variation within
the pre-reform and reform periods.35 Therefore, I estimate two diﬀerent versions of equation (18).
In the ﬁrst version, I replace β3UNILIBt with ρ1REFt+ρ2POSTREFt,w h e r eREFt is a dummy
variable which equals one for 1990-1992 and zero otherwise. Similarly, POSTREFt is equal to one
for 1993-1998 and zero otherwise.36 Both control for the shift in tariﬀs in their respective periods
relative to the constant term, α. In the second version, I replace β3UNILIBt with θtγ where θt
is a 1 × (T − 1) vector of year dummies that capture the yearly common variation in tariﬀsa n d
further relaxes the assumption of a one time overall tariﬀ reduction.37
Next, to eliminate the ﬁxed eﬀects, I use a ﬁrst-diﬀerenced model based on equation (18)
∆logτit = β1∆log(Qit/Mitεit)+β2∆logAit + β3∆UNILIBt + vit (19)
where the error term is vit = ∆uit and it is essentially autocorrelated so I correct for this autocor-
relation in my estimations. Given the deﬁnition of UNILIBt, ∆UNILIBt becomes just a year
dummy for 1990. This may not be adequate to capture the action in the actual data. When we take
ﬁrst diﬀerences, the diﬀerenced data for 1983, 1985, and 1988 automatically get dropped given the
gaps in the sample. Moreover, the trade liberalization took place gradually between 1990 and 1992.
I consider this downward trend in the reform years by employing a diﬀerent version of equation
(19), where I replace β3∆UNILIBt with ϕREFt. REFt is a dummy variable for 1990-1992 as
above, and ϕ is a scalar. I also estimate this modiﬁed version of equation (19) with a constant term
to account for the small tariﬀ changes before and after the reform period where the interpretation
of REFt becomes the deviation from the constant term.
There are potentially endogeneity problems in the estimation. First, Qit/Mitεit is endogenous
with respect to tariﬀs since it depends on domestic prices, hence on tariﬀs. Second, the previ-
ous empirical work documented that trade policy aﬀects productivity which requires accounting
for a potential reverse causation. I use the following list of instruments to deal with the endo-
geneity issues: the capital to output ratio, materials prices, a measure of scale economies (value
added/number of ﬁrms), and the TFP of the upstream industries.38 Instruments should be cor-
35Tariﬀs actually increase between 1982 and 1984 and then start to decline in 1985. The sample, on the other
hand, only includes 1983, 1985, and 1988-1990 for the pre-reform era. Between 1983 and 1988 the trend for tariﬀsi s
a gradual decline within the sample.
36ρ1 and ρ2 are scalars.
37γ is a (T − 1) × 1v e c t o ro fc o e ﬃcients.
38The detailed variable deﬁnitions and sources are in the appendix (Section A.3).
18related with the endogenous regressors and yet be orthogonal to the error term. I present the
formal tests of instrument validity in Section 5.4 but I would like to provide some intuition here.
Capital share is expected to be negatively related to the output/imports ratio (Qit/Mit) given that
Colombia is more likely to produce products with smaller capital content and import those rich
in capital based on a comparative advantage argument. The materials prices aﬀect the domestic
output prices, hence Qit/Mitεit but not the tariﬀs of a given sector i, conditional on Qit, Mit,
and εit. Scale is positively correlated with productivity and it is an inherent characteristic of a
sector. The productivity of a sector is also expected to be aﬀected from the embodied upstream
productivity which is likely to be independent of the sector’s own tariﬀs.
Since the model is quite parsimonious, it is also prone to an omitted variable bias. The use
of the ﬁxed industry eﬀects in equation (18) and its diﬀerent versions, and the ﬁrst diﬀerencing
in equation (19) and its diﬀerent versions should alleviate this potential problem along with the
Instrumental Variables (IV) estimation.
In the rest of this section I present and discuss the data, results, and robustness of my estima-
tions. In Section 6, I test how accounting for the endogeneity of tariﬀs with respect to productivity
aﬀects the regressions that analyze the impact of trade reform on productivity.
5.2 Data
The base data for the estimations span 1982 through 1998 but given the lack of tariﬀ and production
information for certain years the sample reduces to 1983, 1985, and 1988-1998. The tariﬀ and
eﬀective rate of protection (ERP) ﬁgures are obtained from DNP (National Planning Department)
of Colombia at the 8-digit product level,39 which are then aggregated to the 4-digit ISIC sectors by
using simple averages.40 The 4-digit ISIC level import data come from the COMTRADE dataset,
United Nations Statistics Division and the industry production data at the same level are available
through UNIDO’s Industrial Statistics Database.
The productivity estimates, value added, input, and materials prices data are obtained from
Eslava, Haltiwanger, Kugler and Kugler (2004), where each variable (except the value added41)i s
aggregated from the ﬁrm level to the 4-digit ISIC industry level with production shares used as
39The product classiﬁcation code, called “Nabandina”, is due to the Andean Community of Nations. I thank
Marcela Eslava at Universidad de Los Andes/CEDE, Colombia for generously sharing the data.
40I use simple averages to be consistent with the earlier literature. An alternative way would be to use the import
or production shares of each product as weights but these data do not exist for all sample years at this level of
disaggregation.
41The value added is used to compute a measure of scale economies where it is an unweighted total in each sector.
19the weights. The main data source for Eslava et al. (2004) is the Colombian Annual Manufactur-
ers Survey (AMS) by DANE (National Statistical Institute). I discuss further details about the
productivity estimates below in Section 5.2.1.
The import demand elasticity measure is based on the structural estimates in Kee, Nicita and
Olarreaga (2004), which I combine with the GDP data from the World Development Indicators
(WDI), and import data from COMTRADE. The import demand elasticities are available only at
the 3-digit ISIC level.42
In order to obtain the TFP measure of the upstream industries, I employ the input-output
tables provided at the 3-digit ISIC level by Nicita and Olarreaga (2001), which were compiled from
version 4 of the Global Trade Analysis Project (GTAP) database. Excluding the inputs being used
from the own sector, the upstream measure is based on a combination of TFPs of the remaining
input sectors as weighted by their share of usage.
T h ev a r i a b l ed e ﬁnitions and sources are presented more in detail in the appendix (Section A.3).
In Table 4, I provide the summary statistics for all the variables I use in the estimations.
5.2.1 Productivity Estimates
The productivity estimates come from Eslava, Haltiwanger, Kugler and Kugler (2004). They
estimate total factor productivity (TFP) as the residual from the following production function for
each ﬁrm i =1 ,...,N and period t = 1982,...,1998
logXit = b1 logKit + b2 logLit + b3 logEit + b4 logIit +l o gAit (20)
where Kit, Lit, Eit,a n dIit denote capital, labor (total employment hours), energy consumption,
and materials, respectively. An important concern in such an estimation is the simultaneity bias;
that is, productivity shocks may be correlated with the inputs. They correct for this bias by
considering a measure of downstream demand as an instrument for inputs along with regional
government expenditures and input prices. A great advantage of this dataset is that it involves
plant level input prices which have not been available to the other researchers in the ﬁeld requiring
them to use non-parametric estimation techniques.43 Furthermore, the output measures commonly
42See the appendix for a discussion on how the import demand elasticity is computed (Section A.2).
43The methodology in these studies was developed by Olley and Pakes (1996), and advanced by Levinsohn and
Petrin (2003). They employ investment or intermediate inputs to control for the correlation between the input levels
and the unobserved ﬁrm-level productivity shocks.
20used in the literature have usually been the ﬁrm revenue deﬂated by the the industry-level prices.
Thus, within-industry price diﬀerences (e.g. due to diﬀerent markups) have been part of the output
and productivity estimates of such studies, potentially biasing their results.
5.3 Estimation Results
Before moving on to the results, let us ﬁrst observe the simple correlations of total factor productiv-
ity and tariﬀs. The overall correlation coeﬃcient for logAit and logτit in the whole sample of 920
observations is -0.222. This is signiﬁcant at the 1% level and can be observed graphically in Figure
5 as well. In Table 3, I present the correlation matrix for all the combinations of logAit and logτit
across years. The two variables again have a relatively small negative correlation for the most part
which is insigniﬁcant for certain years such as 1992 through 1994. These relationships also appear
in Figure 6 which includes plots of TFP versus tariﬀs by year. In Table 3, it is interesting to note
that the two variables can be concurrently and also intertemporally correlated. This is one reason
why using lagged tariﬀ rates may not get around the endogeneity problem of tariﬀs with respect to
productivity. Topalova (2004) notes a similar pattern in the Indian data for the 1997-2001 period
and excludes this period from her analysis due to her concern about endogeneity.
However, we cannot establish a causal relationship between tariﬀ protection and productivity
with these crude observations alone. We need to control for the other important variables as
required by the theory and tackle the endogeneity issues. In this section, I show how productivity
inﬂuences tariﬀs after I control for the endogeneity of productivity. Later in Section 6, I estimate
a system of equations related to this setup and show that accounting for the eﬀect of productivity
on tariﬀs may strengthen the positive impact of trade reform on productivity.
As noted in Section 5.1, the two right-hand-side variables—the inverse import penetration to
import demand elasticity ratio, and total factor produtivity—in the tariﬀ regressions are portentially
endogenous. I use instrumental variables to address this problem. More speciﬁcally, I employ the
two-step eﬃcient generalized method of moments (henceforth IV-GMM) estimator with either ﬁxed
eﬀects or ﬁrst diﬀerences for my unbalanced panel. This methodology is more eﬃcient than regular
instrumental variables in the presence of heteroskedasdicity of unknown form due to its use of
an optimal weighting matrix (Cragg 1983). A Pagan-Hall (1983) test conﬁrms the presence of
heteroskedasticity in the data and further justiﬁes the use of the IV-GMM methodology.
In Table 5, I present the main estimation results. In column 1, we have the estimates for equa-
21tion (18). As predicted by theory, tariﬀ rates depend positively on the inverse import penetration
to import demand elasticity ratio (Qit/Mitεit) and positively on total factor productivity (Ait).
The coeﬃcients for the two main variables, β1 and β2, are positive and statistically signiﬁcant at
the 1% level. The unilateral liberalization variable, UNILIBt, takes out the common reduction
in the tariﬀs after 1990, and it is signiﬁcant and negative as expected. In column 2, I provide the
estimates for the ﬁst variant of equation (18). Here, we take into account the variation in the data
by dividing it into three periods as opposed to imposing a one time major decline in the tariﬀs.
The two intercept-shifters, REFt (period dummy for 1990-1992) and POSTREFt (period dummy
for 1993-1998), control for the common decline in tariﬀs across sectors relative to the 1983-1989
period and come out negative and signiﬁcant. Thus, the results are in line with the ones in column
1. In column 3, we have the estimates for the second variant of equation (18) that allows for
further variation across time with the year eﬀects and captures the gradual decline in tariﬀs. Both
β1 and β2 are still positive and statistically signiﬁcant at the 1% level in columns 2 and 3. The
year dummies in column 3 are jointly signiﬁcant just like the industry ﬁxed eﬀects are in all three
equations.
A positive coeﬃcient on Qit/Mitεit, such that tariﬀs are inversely related to import penetration
and import demand elasticity is a result consistent with the previous ﬁndings in the empirical
political economy literature (such as Gawande and Bandyopadhyay 2000 for the U.S., Mitra et al.
2002 for Turkey, and Karacaovali and Lim˜ ao 2005a for the EU). A positive coeﬃcient for Ait,t h a t
is more productive sectors receive higher tariﬀ protection, complements this result and conﬁrms my
major theoretical prediction. This result is also important because none of the earlier researchers
s e p a r a t et h es i z ee ﬀect into Ait and Qit. Moreover, I account for the exogenous unilateral liberal-
ization shock common across sectors in all speciﬁcations so there is no doubt that political economy
does matter for the sectoral variation in tariﬀs. Therefore, endogeneity of tariﬀs with respect to
productivity is a prevailing problem when researchers plainly regress tariﬀs on productivity.
In Table 6, I provide the estimates of equation (18) and its variants that measure the eﬀect of
yearly productivity changes on tariﬀ changes with the ﬁrst diﬀerenced data. The methodology is
still IV-GMM and I employ the ﬁrst diﬀerences of each instrument from Table 5. The sample now
reduces to 1988-1998 given the gaps in the data. In column 1, β1 and β2 have the expected signs
but are not signiﬁcant. This result is not surprising given that ∆UNILIBt fails to recognize the
gradual decline in tariﬀs and acts as a single year eﬀect for 1990. I correct for this by estimating
22equation (18) and replacing ∆UNILIBt with a common term for the 1990-1992 period (REFt)
during which the liberalization took place step by step (column 2). In this version, β1 becomes
signiﬁcant at the 10% level and β2 at the 5%. REFt has a negative and signiﬁcant (at the 1%
level) coeﬃcient capturing the common downward trend. In column 3, I further allow for a common
constant term on top of REFt recognizing the small changes in the other years, and both β1 and
β2 become signiﬁcant at the 5% level. These results indicate that due to political economy, the
extent of liberalization is smaller for the sectors with a smaller reduction or a higher increase in
their productivity as compared to similar sectors. Note that in all diﬀerenced results, β1 and β2
are statistically identical, which is predicted by the model. In levels, this may not occur because
of ﬁxed eﬀects.
Although the theoretical section involves protection through tariﬀs, I repeat the speciﬁcations
in Table 5 and Table 6 with the eﬀective rates of protection (ERP) in order to see whether the
r e s u l t sh o l dw i t had i ﬀerent measure of protection. Eﬀective rates are based on value added and
essentially take into account the eﬀect of tariﬀs on the inputs as well. ERP data are provided by the
National Planning Department of Colombia (DNP) and I am limited by their computations since
I do not have the detailed data to calculate them myself. As can be observed from Figure 1 and
Table 4, the eﬀective rates are higher than the regular tariﬀ rates but otherwise display a similar
trend. I exclude the three sectors44 that exhibit negative ERP (in levels not logs), because it is
hard to argue that these sectors are indeed protected. In Table 7, I repeat the speciﬁcations from
Table 5 and the results appear to be totally consistent. The only diﬀerence is that the signiﬁcance
levels for the main variables are lower, and the constant term becomes insigniﬁcant in columns 2
and 3. The same arguments apply to the ﬁgures in Table 8 which are the replicas of the estimates
from Table 6 with ERP. The results are again qualitatively similar but less signiﬁcant.
In the next section, I provide speciﬁcation tests and some sensitiviy analysis for the main
estimations I covered. Then, in Section 6, I discuss how accounting for the endogeneity of tariﬀ
policy, as implied by my theoretical and empirical results, may improve the estimates of the eﬀect
of trade reform on productivity.
44The excluded sectors are: a) ISIC 3122, manufacture of prepared animal feeds; b) ISIC 3512, manufacture of
fertilizers and pesticides; c) ISIC 3822, manufacture of agricultural machinery and equipment.
235.4 Robustness and Speciﬁcation Tests
I nT a b l e9 ,Ie x a m i n et h ee ﬀect of past productivity on current tariﬀs to check whether policy
implementation occurs with a one period lag although it is not part of the model. I employ one
period lags of scale and upstream TFP as instruments for the lag of productivity, and hence repeat
the speciﬁcations in Table 5 with logAit−1 instead of logAit.Iﬁnd that more productivity yesterday
calls for more protection today in all three speciﬁcations. However, precaution is required while
interpreting this result since it might be picking up the persistence in tariﬀsa sw e l l .
In tables 10 and 11, I present the biased ordinary least squares (OLS) results for comparison.
In Table 10, I provide the estimates of equation (18), and in Table 11 the estimates of equation
(19) with OLS using both tariﬀsa n de ﬀective rates of protection. The OLS coeﬃcients have the
same signs as the IV-GMM estimates but they are smaller. In addition to that, log(Qit/Mitεit)a n d
∆log(Qit/Mitεit)h a v es i g n i ﬁcant coeﬃcients in all speciﬁcations while the coeﬃcients for logAit
and ∆logAit are insigniﬁcant in all except the one for ∆logAit in Table 11, column 2.
Ic o n ﬁrm the endogeneity of log(Qit/Mitεit)a n dl o gAit econometrically through a Durbin-Wu-
Hausman endogeneity test, which further justiﬁes the use of instrumental variables instead of OLS.
Furthermore, the Hansen-Sargan test of overidentifying restrictions indicate that our instruments
are valid, that is they are uncorrelated with the error term and correctly excluded from the es-
timated equations. The probability value for the null hypothesis that the instruments are valid,
range from 0.144 to 0.933 for the main speciﬁcations presented in Table 5. The Hansen-Sargan test
probability values are presented in the last row of each relevant table and they have high values,
as desired, for the estimations in ﬁrst diﬀerences (Table 6) as well. The tests are not strong for the
ERP speciﬁcations, but given the endogeneity and good performance with tariﬀs, it is prudent to
keep these instruments and ensure comparability with the tariﬀ results.
In Table 12, I report the ﬁrst stage regressions for the main tariﬀ speciﬁcation in Table 5,
column 1, where we see that all the instruments are jointly signiﬁcant and the regressions have
a high explanatory power. I also ﬁnd that the results are not driven by any speciﬁc instrument
which I check by excluding each one at a time.45 In Table 13, we have the ﬁrst stage regressions for
the main ﬁrst-diﬀerenced speciﬁcation (Table 6, column 1) which are not as strong as the ones in
Table 12 in terms of the explanatory power but all the instruments are still jointly signiﬁcant. The
partial R-squared values based on Shea (1997) indicate that the instruments for logAit explain a
45Including labor share as an additional instrument also does not change the results qualitatively but lowers the
probability value of the Hansen-Sargan test.
24substantial fraction of its variation. The same is not true for log(Qit/Mitεit)a n dt h eﬁrst-diﬀerenced
equations.
Figure 1 indicates that in Colombia the major trade liberalization era started in 1990 and
continued until 1992 where new persistently lower levels of tariﬀs were reached. Given the restric-
tiveness of UNILIBt by construction, I allowed it to take 1991 instead of 1990 as the cutoﬀ point
as well and the results remain robust to this diﬀerent cutoﬀ value. Furthermore, when UNILIBt
is excluded, the coeﬃcient magnitudes rise but the results carry through.
6 Endogeneity Bias and the Eﬀect of Tariﬀso nP r o d u c t i v i t y
The theoretical and empirical results I presented in the earlier sections indicate that we should
be worried about the endogeneity of trade policy with respect to productivity. If the researchers
do not account for the endogeneity, their estimates of the trade policy eﬀects on productivity will
be biased. However, it is hard to tell the direction and magnitude of the endogeneity bias unless
the system is very simple.46 Once we have other regressors in the system, the correlations among
them do not permit us to make any predictions about the bias. Therefore, I illustrate how the bias
might be working with a system of equations below.
In constructing this system, I partly rely on the setup of my estimations in the previous section.
On the other hand, I do not have a structural equation showing how productivity depends on tariﬀs
so I just try to keep it similar to the estimations in the earlier empirical literature. I model the
tariﬀ and inverse import penetration equations as before and add a third equation for productivity
as follows
logAit = α1 + α2 logτit +( l o gZ1it)α3 + µ1iα4 + Z2tα5 + υ1it (21a)
logτit = β1 + β2 logAit + β3 log(Qit/Mitεit)+µ2iβ4 + θtβ5 + υ2it (21b)
log(Qit/Mitεit)=γ1 + γ2 logτit +( l o gZ3it)γ3 + υ3it (21c)
where υ1it, υ2it,a n dυ3it are the error terms for sector i =1 ,...,N at period t =1 ,...,T. µ1i and
46Suppose that we have the following two equations that relate tariﬀs and productivity: (1) logAit = a1+a2 logτit+










w1.I f t h e t r u e v a l u e s o f a2 and b2 are such that a2 < 0a n db2 > 0, then we
have cov(w1it,logτit) > 0. If we estimate a2 with OLS, ignoring equation (2), and get b a2 < 0w h i c hi sp o s i t i v e l y
correlated with a2, we would have an upward bias, hence underestimate a2.
25µ2i are 1×(N −1) vectors of industry dummies, and θt is a 1×(T −1) vector of year dummies. Z1it
and Z3it are 1×2 vectors of control variables at the 4-digit ISIC sector level, whereas Z2t is a 1×2
vector of economy-wide controls.47 Z1it includes the scale measure and upstream TFP, whereas
Z3it includes the capital to output ratio and materials prices. Note that these industry level control
variables are precisely the instruments I used in the instrumental variables estimations in Section
5 so they are expected to be exogenous. The other advantage of these controls is that I get a
consistent framework with the rest of my estimations. Z2t includes GDP growth and inﬂation to
control for the macro changes in the economy that might aﬀect the productivity in all the sectors.
My estimates of equation (21a) are at the 4-digit industry level. This limitation precludes any
direct comparison between my estimates and the ones in the recent ﬁrm-level studies. However,
after I estimate the system with three-stage least squares (3SLS), I compare these results with the
simple OLS estimates of equation (21a) that ignore the endogeneity and get the chance to test
whether accounting for endogeneity improves the results within my dataset.
In Table 14, I provide the comparative results of estimating the whole system with 3SLS and
estimating equation (21a) with OLS only. As in line with the earlier literature, a negative OLS
estimate of the coeﬃcient for tariﬀs in equation (21a), i.e. b α2 < 0, indicates that productivity is
inversely related to tariﬀs. The 3SLS regression results not only conﬁrm this ﬁnding but also show
that the positive eﬀect of lower tariﬀs on productivity grows slightly stronger (by 1.5%) when I
account for the endogeneity of tariﬀs. The 3SLS results from equation (21b) are similar to the
ﬁndings I present in Table 5: more productive sectors receive higher protection, and tariﬀsa r e
inversely related to import penetration and import demand elasticity. In Table 15, I replicate
the estimations from Table 14 by using eﬀective rates of protection instead of tariﬀsa n dﬁnd
identical results. However, this time the positive impact of liberalization on productivity is larger
by 17% when we estimate the whole system. These ﬁndings indicate that the trade policy eﬀects
on productivity might be underestimated when endogeneity is not accounted for.
7C o n c l u d i n g R e m a r k s
I show, both theoretically and empirically, that we should be concerned about the endogeneity of
trade policy with respect to productivity. This has been neglected for the most part in the recent
47Note that α1, α2, β1, β2, β3, γ1,a n dγ2 are scalars. α3, α5,a n dγ3 are 2×1, α4 and β4 are (N −1)×1v e c t o r s ,
and β5 is a (T − 1) × 1v e c t o r .
26empirical literature. Studies that investigate the eﬀect of trade policy on productivity often argue
that the exogeneity of the trade liberalization shock helps to identify a linkage without worrying
too much about the endogeneity of tariﬀs or other forms of trade policy. I account for such an
argument in my theoretical and empirical models, and still obtain tariﬀs to be endogenous.
I employ a basic political economy of trade protection model and also introduce two diﬀerent
channels of protection that lead to unilateral liberalization once they are removed. The extra
channels are meant to capture the perceived beneﬁt of protection to the governments even in the
absence of political economy concerns. I ﬁrst keep the liberalization channel very simple to ensure
that my results are not driven by any speciﬁc assumptions or complications and then give more
structure to it by modeling a learning-by-doing argument. The main result from my theoretical
models, simple yet compelling, is that despite an exogenous unilateral trade liberalization shock
that is common across sectors, we obtain a diﬀerentiated eﬀect across sectoral protection based on
productivity. Based on my theory, I predict that more productive sectors receive more protection
and that the extent of liberalization is less for sectors that experience a higher productivity increase.
Next, I test and conﬁrm these theoretical results using production, trade, and tariﬀ data at
the 4-digit ISIC industry level for Colombia between 1983 and 1998. I keep all of my estimations
closely related to my theory and account for all the potential endogeneity problems by using relevant
instruments and methodologies.
Finally, I estimate a system of equations and show that by not accounting for the endogeneity
of trade policy with respect to productivity, we might underestimate the positive impact of trade
reform on productivity. Thus, correcting for the endogeneity bias does not overturn the results
in the early empirical literature but makes them somewhat stronger for Colombia which would be
interesting to test for diﬀerent countries as well.
As a natural extension to this paper, it would be useful to carefully model the eﬀect of tariﬀs
on productivity and obtain a more structural simultaneous equations model considering all the
interdependencies between tariﬀs, productivity, and their determinants.
27AA p p e n d i x
A.1 Derivations
Equation (2)





=( ω − 1)AiQi(τi)+τiM0
i(τi) (22)
Equating to zero and solving for τi, and then dividing both sides of this expression by pw
i =1a n d
using the following elasticity deﬁnition εi ≡− M0
ipw
i /Mi yields equation (2).
Equation (6)
In order to obtain equation (6), we implicitly diﬀerentiate the speciﬁct a r i ﬀ version of τi as
expressed in equation (5) with respect to α and use the linearity assumption for Mi (so that
M00
i = 0), the restriction 0 <α<2 − D0
i/AiQ0
i and concavity of σi(τi)( i . e .σ0













The ﬁrst order condition for a solution to equation (11) is
∂Et(Git + δGit+1)
∂τit
























which after a few steps of manipulation becomes
∂Et(Git + δGit+1)
∂τit
























Using equation (12) to substitute in for τe
it+1(τit) and employing the deﬁnition in equation (14),
28the ﬁrst order condition simpliﬁes to
∂Et(Git + δGit+1)
∂τit
=( ω − 1)φitQit(τit)+τitM0
it + δωΛi = 0 (26)
Dividing both sides of equation (26) by pw
i = 1 and using the same elasticity term εi as described
above yields equation (13).
Equations (16a), (16b), and (16c)








The relationships in equations (16a), (16b), and (16c) are then obtained by plugging equation
(27) in equation (26) and diﬀerentiating τit in equation (26) with respect to φit+1 (implicitly), φit
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The actual tariﬀ in period t+1 is similar to the one in equation (12) but now its terms are not
dependent on Xit, because I assume that the LBD process is realized to be a false perception:




Now, by using equation (13) and equation (31), we can express the diﬀerence in the tariﬀ rates
29between the two periods as






















i(.)+( ω − 1)φit+1Q0
it+1(τit+1)
> 0 (33)
30A.2 Import Demand Elasticity
In the theory section, I deﬁne the import demand elasticity, εi,a sM0
ipw
i /Mi but traditionally and
in the empirical data it is evaluated at the domestic prices, not the world prices. I take this into
account in obtaining the elasticity adjusted inverse import penetration ratio, given the fact that















I use the structural estimates from Kee, Nicita and Olarreaga (2004) to compute the import





+ sit − 1 (35)
where sit i st h en e g a t i v eo ft h ei m p o r t st oG D Pr a t i oa n dai is an estimated structural price
parameter from a GDP function.
31A.3 Variable Deﬁnitions and Sources
Name Definition  Source 
τit  Advalorem tariff rate (%): Obtained at the 8-digit 
product level (“Nabandina” code) and aggregated 
to the 4-digit ISIC level by simple averaging  
National Planning Department 
(DNP), Colombia 
τit
eff  Effective rate of protection (%): Obtained at the 8-
digit product level (“Nabandina” code) and 
aggregated to the 4-digit ISIC level by simple 
averaging 
National Planning Department 
(DNP), Colombia 
Xit  Output values in 1000 USD at the 4-digit ISIC 
level 
UNIDO, Industrial Statistics 
Database 
Mit  Import values in 1000 USD at the 4-digit ISIC 
level 
COMTRADE, United Nations 
Statistics Division 
εit  Import demand elasticity at the 3-digit ISIC level: 
obtained by combining import and GDP data with 
estimated structural price parameters. 
Structural estimates (Kee et al. 
2004), GDP (World 
Development Indicators, 
World Bank), imports 
(COMTRADE). 
Ait  Total factor productivity (TFP): Obtained at the 
firm level by estimating production function 
residuals with a 2SLS model. Aggregated from the 
firm to the 4-digit ISIC level by using production 
shares as weights. 
Eslava, Haltiwanger, Kugler 
and Kugler (2004) 
Capital 
Share 
Capital stock series obtained at the firm level using 
fixed assets, gross investment, “observed” 
depreciation rates, and a gross capital formation 
deflator. The ratio of capital stock to output is then 
aggregated to the 4-digit ISIC level by using firms’ 
production shares as weights. 
Eslava, Haltiwanger, Kugler 
and Kugler (2004) 
Materials 
Prices 
Obtained at the firm level using Tornqvist indices 
which are aggregated to the 4-digit ISIC level by 
using firms’ production shares as weights. 
Eslava, Haltiwanger, Kugler 
and Kugler (2004) 
Scale  The ratio of total value added to the number of 
firms in a given 4-digit ISIC sector.  
Eslava, Haltiwanger, Kugler 
and Kugler (2004) 
Upstream 
TFP 
Using the input-output tables at the 3-digit ISIC 
level, I exclude the inputs being used from the own 
sector, and obtain the upstream measure based on a 
combination of TFPs of the remaining input 
sectors as weighted by their share of usage. 
Input-output tables (Nicita and 
Olarreaga 2001, originally 
from Global Trade Analysis 




The annual percentage change in the GDP 
(constant 2000 US dollars) 
World Development 
Indicators (WDI), World Bank
Inflation  Annual percentage change in the GDP deflator  World Development 
Indicators (WDI), World Bank
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FIGURE 1.  Average Tariffs and Effective Rates of Protection in Colombia 1983-1998 
 
 
Source: DNP and author’s own calculations. 
 
FIGURE 2. Histogram of the Percentage Decline in Tariffs between 1983 and 1995 at the 4-
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FIGURE 3. Histogram of the Percentage Decline in Tariffs between 1988 and 1995 at the 4-
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Note: Tariff reduction is calculated as [log(1+τi1988)-log(1+ τi1995)]*100 
Source: DNP and author’s own calculations. 
 
FIGURE 4. Histogram of the Percentage Decline in Tariffs between 1983-1989 average and 
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TABLE 1. Spearman’s Rank Correlation Matrix for Tariffs over Time 
 
  τ1983  τ1985  τ1988  τ1989  τ1990  τ1991  τ1992  τ1993  τ1994  τ1995  τ1996  τ1997 
τ1985  0.928  1            
τ1988  0.861  0.953  1           
τ1989  0.862  0.954  0.997  1          
τ1990  0.806  0.925  0.952  0.954 1         
τ1991  0.733  0.823  0.830  0.847 0.893 1        
τ1992  0.688  0.764  0.771  0.768 0.795 0.866 1       
τ1993  0.700  0.761  0.773  0.770 0.779 0.861 0.993 1      
τ1994  0.688  0.763  0.777  0.778 0.797 0.876 0.997 0.991 1     
τ1995 0.720 0.794  0.801  0.807 0.828 0.898 0.986 0.978 0.989 1     
τ1996 0.727 0.847  0.874  0.882 0.897 0.857 0.885 0.874 0.887 0.922  1   
τ1997  0.732 0.852 0.882 0.882 0.907 0.859 0.887 0.876 0.889 0.925 0.999  1 
τ1998  0.724 0.845 0.874 0.882 0.899 0.856 0.888 0.877 0.889 0.924 0.998 0.999






























TABLE 2. Summary Statistics for Tariffs over Time 
 
 





τ1983 78  0.427 0.221  0.516  0.09  1.15 
τ1985 78  0.377 0.148  0.393  0.059  0.70 
τ1988 78  0.347 0.155  0.448  0.07  0.70 
τ1989 75  0.344 0.155  0.451  0.07  0.70 
τ1990 76  0.297 0.115  0.386  0.07  0.50 
τ1991 74  0.211 0.093  0.442  0.016  0.35 
τ1992 68  0.134 0.045  0.334  0.05  0.20 
τ1993 65  0.135 0.046  0.343  0.05  0.20 
τ1994 63  0.136 0.045  0.333  0.05  0.20 
τ1995 65  0.136 0.046  0.334  0.043  0.20 
τ1996 67  0.139 0.046  0.333  0.048  0.20 
τ1997 66  0.140 0.046  0.332  0.048  0.20 
τ1998 67  0.140 0.045  0.323  0.048  0.20 
 Note:  τt stands for the average 4-digit ISIC level tariff in year t. 
 







TABLE 3. Correlation Matrix for Tariffs and Productivity over Time 
 
 logτ1983 logτ1985 logτ1988 logτ1989 logτ1990 logτ1991 logτ1992 logτ1993 logτ1994 logτ1995 logτ1996 logτ1997 logτ1998 
logA1983  -0.187  -0.153 -0.064 -0.071 -0.049 0.003  -0.100 -0.117 -0.073 -0.088 -0.007 -0.014 0.007 
logA1985 -0.233**  -0.179  -0.108 -0.116 -0.104 -0.076 -0.085 -0.097 -0.076 -0.108 0.012  0.008  0.028 
logA1988 -0.220*  -0.237**  -0.269**  -0.211*  -0.249**  -0.198*  -0.144 -0.151 -0.158 -0.226*  -0.241**  -0.244**  -0.239* 
logA1989  -0.208* -0.217* -0.197* -0.199*  -0.233**  -0.206*  -0.141 -0.125 -0.129 -0.196 -0.219*  -0.223*  -0.220* 
logA1990  -0.223*  -0.241** -0.235** -0.229** -0.260**  -0.253**  -0.138 -0.135 -0.146 -0.198 -0.233*  -0.231*  -0.233* 
logA1991  -0.177  -0.195* -0.238**  -0.224* -0.234**  -0.268**  -0.127 -0.124 -0.132 -0.203 -0.205 -0.204 -0.208* 
logA1992 -0.145 -0.156 -0.158 -0.162 -0.163 -0.251**  -0.039  -0.054 -0.074 -0.199 -0.113 -0.112 -0.115 
logA1993 -0.170 -0.193 -0.200 -0.204 -0.229*  -0.265**  -0.161 -0.148  -0.163 -0.201 -0.257**  -0.258**  -0.260** 
logA1994  -0.195  -0.251** -0.263** -0.262** -0.308** -0.362*** -0.185  -0.161  -0.175  -0.218*  -0.275** -0.271** -0.277** 
logA1995  -0.179  -0.225* -0.239* -0.238* -0.269**  -0.346*** -0.154  -0.132  -0.147  -0.227*  -0.225* -0.225* -0.227* 
logA1996  -0.180  -0.217*  -0.245** -0.245** -0.257** -0.297** -0.141  -0.125  -0.144  -0.213*  -0.241**  -0.244** -0.247** 
logA1997 -0.167 -0.194 -0.226*  -0.231*  -0.241*  -0.294**  -0.146 -0.126 -0.143 -0.220*  -0.225*  -0.232*  -0.234* 
logA1998  -0.206*  -0.229*  -0.272** -0.271** -0.294** -0.337*** -0.223*  -0.205  -0.219*  -0.265** -0.302** -0.307** -0.311** 
Note: logτt stands for the natural logarithm of the average 4-digit ISIC level tariff in year t, and logAt stands for the natural logarithm of the 













TABLE 4. Summary Statistics for All the Variables in the Estimations 
 
 Observations  Mean  Standard 
Deviation 
Minimum Maximum 
logτit 920  -1.646  0.641  -4.107  0.140 
∆logτit  840 -0.093  0.228  -1.971 1.583 
logτit
eff  902 -1.128  0.884  -4.294 1.556 
∆logτit
eff  821 -0.113  0.526  -12.613  2.377 
log(Qit/Mitεit)  920 0.248  2.376  -6.139  11.470 
∆log(Qit/Mitεit)  840 -0.098  0.641  -6.025 3.201 
logAit  920 1.508  0.590  0.091 4.097 
∆logAit  840 0.031  0.270  -1.951  2.154 
logCapital Share  920 -1.765  0.777  -5.549 0.598 
∆logCapital Share
  840 0.027  0.324  -3.714  1.771 
logMaterials Prices 920  -0.067  0.267  -1.488  0.929 
∆logMaterials Prices 840  -0.018  0.134 -0.777  1.338 
logScale 920  11.726  1.489  5.595  16.264 
∆logScale  830 0.050  0.528  -5.107  3.488 
logUpstream TFP 920  1.523  0.140  1.206  2.096 
∆logUpstream TFP 840  0.017  0.067  -0.205  0.490 
GDP growth  920 3.445  1.621  0.570 6.042 
Inflation  920 24.037  7.158  14.773  45.357 
Notes: The tariff data are not available for 1982, 1986, and 1987 so we start out with 1310 4-digit ISIC 
tariff lines. When we take into account the missing output figures (not present for the whole year of 1984), 
the sample reduces to 1004 observations. Finally, considering the other missing observations on the right-




















TABLE 5. The Effect of Productivity on Tariffs  
 
 (1)  (2)  (3) 
log(Qit/Mitεit) 0.390***  0.606***  0.864*** 
(β1>0) (0.073)  (0.142)  (0.173) 
logAit  0.271*** 0.386***  0.551*** 
(β2>0) (0.066)  (0.097)  (0.116) 
UNILIBt  -0.533***    
(β3<0) (0.065)     
REFt   -0.492***   
(ρ1<0)   (0.035)   
POSTREFt   -0.306**   
(ρ2<0)   (0.154)   
Constant  -1.536*** -1.884***  -2.186*** 
 (0.190)  (0.269)  (0.296) 
Year Effects  No No  Yes 
Observations 920  920  920 
Chi
2-test p-val for all µi=0 
a 0.000  0.000  0.000 
Chi
2-test p-val for all θt=0 
b n/a  n/a  0.000 
Hansen’s J p-val 
c 0.144  0.180  0.933 
Notes: (1) Standard errors are in parentheses. (2) *, **, and *** indicate significance at a 10%, 5%, and 1% 
level, respectively. (3) The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of the advalorem tariff rate (logτit).      
(4) The predicted signs for the coefficients of the regressors are indicated in parentheses below them.        
(5) All the regressions include 4-digit ISIC industry dummies as regressors but are not reported. (6) List of 
the instruments (all in logs): Capital share, materials prices (deviated from the producer price index), 
measure of scale economies (value added/number of firms), and the TFP of upstream sectors.  
a “Chi
2-test p-val for all µi=0” provides the probability value for the Chi-squared test of H0: All µi (industry 
fixed effects) are jointly insignificant.  
b “Chi
2-test p-val for all θt =0” provides the probability value for the Chi-squared test of H0: All θt (year 
effects) are jointly insignificant.  
c “Hansen’s J p-val” provides the probability value for the Hansen-Sargan test of overidentifying 
restrictions for H0: Excluded instruments are uncorrelated with the error term and correctly excluded from 




















TABLE 6. The Effect of Productivity Differences on Tariff Differences 
 
 (1)  (2)  (3) 
∆log(Qit/Mitεit)  0.190 0.514*  0.449** 
(β1>0) (0.726)  (0.290)  (0.213) 
∆logAit  0.231 0.519**  0.476** 
(β2>0) (0.658)  (0.263)  (0.209) 
∆UNILIBt  -0.120***    
(β3<0) (0.031)     
REFt   -0.185***  -0.231*** 
(φ <0)   (0.069)  (0.045) 
Constant     0.031* 
     (0.016) 
Observations 676  676  676 
Hansen’s J p-val 
a 0.572  0.929  0.958 
Notes: (1) Standard errors are in parentheses. (2) *, **, and *** indicate significance at a 10%, 5%, and 1% 
level, respectively. (3) The dependent variable is the one year change in the natural logarithm of the 
advalorem tariff rate (logτit). (4) The predicted signs for the coefficients of the regressors are indicated in 
parentheses below them. (5) List of the instruments (all in logs): First differences of capital share, materials 
prices (deviated from the producer price index), measure of scale economies (value added/number of firms), 
and the TFP of upstream sectors. (6) All estimations allow for arbitrary intra-industry correlation over time. 
a “Hansen’s J p-val” provides the probability value for the Hansen-Sargan test of overidentifying 
restrictions for H0: Excluded instruments are uncorrelated with the error term and correctly excluded from 






















TABLE 7. The Effect of Productivity on the Effective Rates of Protection  
 
 (1)  (2)  (3) 
log(Qit/Mitεit) 0.333***  0.270*  0.303** 
(β1>0) (0.084)  (0.142)  (0.139) 
logAit  0.261*** 0.190** 0.198** 
(β2>0) (0.070)  (0.091)  (0.096) 
UNILIBt  -0.598***    
(β3<0) (0.079)     
REFt   -0.500***   
(ρ1<0)   (0.045)   
POSTREFt   -0.715***   
(ρ2<0)   (0.165)   
Year Effects  No No  Yes 
Constant  -0.415** -0.207 -0.066 
(α>0) (0.198)  (0.363)  (0.342) 
Observations 887  887  887 
Chi
2-test p-val for all µi=0 
a 0.000  0.000  0.000 
Chi
2-test p-val for all θt=0 
b n/a  n/a  0.000 
Hansen’s J p-val 
c 0.004  0.001  0.000 
Notes: (1) Standard errors are in parentheses. (2) *, **, and *** indicate significance at a 10%, 5%, and 1% 
level, respectively. (3) The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of the effective rate of protection 
(logτit
eff). (4) The predicted signs for the coefficients of the regressors are indicated in parentheses below 
them. (5) All the regressions include 4-digit ISIC industry dummies as regressors but are not reported. (6) 
List of the instruments (all in logs): Capital share, materials prices (deviated from the producer price index), 
measure of scale economies (value added/number of firms), and the TFP of upstream sectors.  
a “Chi
2-test p-val for all µi=0” provides the probability value for the Chi-squared test of H0: All µi (industry 
fixed effects) are jointly insignificant.  
b “Chi
2-test p-val for all θt =0” provides the probability value for the Chi-squared test of H0: All θt (year 
effects) are jointly insignificant.  
c “Hansen’s J p-val” provides the probability value for the Hansen-Sargan test of overidentifying 
restrictions for H0: Excluded instruments are uncorrelated with the error term and correctly excluded from 
























TABLE 8. The Effect of Productivity Differences on the Effective Rate of Protection 
Differences 
 
 (1)  (2)  (3) 
∆log(Qit/Mitεit)  0.337 0.553  0.519* 
(β1>0) (0.838)  (0.337)  (0.269) 
∆logAit  0.297 0.504*  0.490* 
(β2>0) (0.758)  (0.294)  (0.251) 
∆UNILIBt  -0.105***    
(β3<0) (0.040)     
REFt   -0.182**  -0.223*** 
(φ<0)   (0.089)  (0.065) 
Constant     0.032 
     (0.021) 
Observations 652  652  652 
Hansen’s J p-val 
a 0.482  0.695  0.765 
Notes: (1) Standard errors are in parentheses. (2) *, **, and *** indicate significance at a 10%, 5%, and 1% 
level, respectively. (3) The dependent variable is the one year change in the natural logarithm of the 
effective rate of protection (logτit
eff). (4) The predicted signs for the coefficients of the regressors are 
indicated in parentheses below them. (5) List of the instruments (all in logs): First differences of capital 
share, materials prices (deviated from the producer price index), measure of scale economies (value 
added/number of firms), and the TFP of upstream sectors. (6) All estimations allow for arbitrary intra-
industry correlation over time. 
a “Hansen’s J p-val” provides the probability value for the Hansen-Sargan test of overidentifying 
restrictions for H0: Excluded instruments are uncorrelated with the error term and correctly excluded from 





















TABLE 9. The Effect of Past Productivity on Current Tariffs 
 
 (1)  (2)  (3) 
log(Qit/Mitεit) 0.586***  0.518***  0.351*** 
(β1>0) (0.116)  (0.118)  (0.101) 
logAit-1  0.186** 0.168**  0.205*** 
(β2>0) (0.088)  (0.080)  (0.067) 
UNILIBt  -0.361***    
(β3<0) (0.104)     
REFt   -0.494***   
(ρ1<0)   (0.044)   
POSTREFt   -0.381***   
(ρ2<0)   (0.139)   
Constant  -2.207*** -2.058***  -1.610*** 
 (0.289)  (0.293)  (0.239) 
Year Effects  No No  Yes 
Observations 895  895  895 
Chi
2-test p-val for all µi=0 
a 0.000  0.000  0.000 
Chi
2-test p-val for all θt=0 
b n/a  n/a  0.000 
Hansen’s J p-val 
c 0.406  0.061  0.056 
Notes: (1) Standard errors are in parentheses. (2) *, **, and *** indicate significance at a 10%, 5%, and 1% 
level, respectively. (3) The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of the advalorem tariff rate (logτit).      
(4) The predicted signs for the coefficients of the regressors are indicated in parentheses below them.        
(5) All the regressions include 4-digit ISIC industry dummies as regressors but are not reported. (6) List of 
the instruments (all in logs): Capital share, materials prices (deviated from the producer price index), one 
period lag of the measure of scale economies (value added/number of firms), and one period lag of the TFP 
of upstream sectors.  
a “Chi
2-test p-val for all µi=0” provides the probability value for the Chi-squared test of H0: All µi (industry 
fixed effects) are jointly insignificant.  
b “Chi
2-test p-val for all θt =0” provides the probability value for the Chi-squared test of H0: All θt (year 
effects) are jointly insignificant.  
c “Hansen’s J p-val” provides the probability value for the Hansen-Sargan test of overidentifying 
restrictions for H0: Excluded instruments are uncorrelated with the error term and correctly excluded from 





















TABLE 10. The Effect of Productivity on Tariffs and Effective Rates of Protection: OLS 
Results 
 
 (1)  (2) 
 logτit  logτit
eff
 
log(Qit/Mitεit) 0.125***  0.134*** 
(β1>0) (0.015)  (0.019) 
logAit  0.046 0.071 
(β2>0) (0.032)  (0.046) 
UNILIBt  -0.731*** -0.741*** 
(β3<0) (0.024)  (0.031) 
Constant  3.418*** 0.199** 
(α>0) (0.078)  (0.092) 
Observations 920  887 
R
2 0.823  0.842 
Wald test p-val 
a 0.000  0.000 
Notes: (1) Standard errors are in parentheses. (2) *, **, and *** indicate significance at a 10%, 5%, and 1% 
level, respectively. (3) logτit is the natural logarithm of the advalorem tariff rate, and logτit
eff is the natural 
logarithm of the effective rate of protection. (4) The predicted signs for the coefficients of the regressors 
are indicated in parentheses below them. (5) The estimates include 4-digit ISIC industry dummies as 
regressors but are not reported.  






























TABLE 11. The Effect of Productivity Differences on Tariff and Effective Rate of 
Protection Differences: OLS Results 
 
 (1)  (2) 
  ∆logτit  ∆logτit
eff
 
∆log(Qit/Mitεit) 0.076***  0.084*** 
(β1>0) (0.022)  (0.031) 
∆logAit  0.079* 0.071 
(β2>0) (0.046)  (0.066) 
∆UNILIBt  -0.128*** -0.113*** 
(β3<0) (0.017)  (0.031) 
Observations 676  652 
R
2 0.056  0.042 
Wald test p-val 
a 0.000  0.021 
Notes: (1) Standard errors are in parentheses. (2) *, **, and *** indicate significance at a 10%, 5%, and 1% 
level, respectively. (3) ∆logτit is the one year change in the natural logarithm of the advalorem tariff rate, 
and ∆logτit
eff is the one year change in the natural logarithm of the effective rate of protection. (4) The 
predicted signs for the coefficients of the regressors are indicated in parentheses below them. (5) All 
estimations allow for arbitrary intra-industry correlation over time. 



























TABLE 12. First Stage Regressions: Table 5 Column 1 Specification 
 
  log(Qit/Mitεit)  logAit 
UNILIBt  -0.686*** 0.097*** 
  (0.0672) (0.020) 
logCapital Share  -0.109 -0.334*** 
  (0.069) (0.020) 
logMaterials Prices  0.432*** 0.008 
  (0.159) (0.047) 
logScale  -0.139*** 0.187*** 
  (0.0458) (0.013) 
logUpstream TFP  -0.901*** 0.435*** 
  (0.303) (0.088) 
Constant  4.531*** -2.164*** 
 (0.703)  (0.205) 
Observations 920  920 
R
2 0.897  0.858 
Adjusted R
2 0.887  0.844 
Shea’s partial R
2 0.033  0.434 
F statistic  86.67  59.96 
Wald test p-val 
a 0.000  0.000 
F statistic for excluded instruments  7.02  160.72 
Wald test p-val excluded instruments 
b 0.000  0.000 
Notes: (1) Standard errors are in parentheses. (2) *, **, and *** indicate significance at a 10%, 5%, and 1% 
level, respectively. (3) These first stage regressions refer to the main tariff specification in column 1 of 
Table 5. (4) The dependent variables are indicated in the header row of each column.  
a Wald test p-val provides the probability value for the F-test of H0: The instruments are jointly 
insignificant. 





















TABLE 13. First Stage Regressions: Table 6 Column 1 Specification 
 
  ∆log(Qit/Mitεit)  ∆logAit 
∆UNILIBt  -0.064 0.053** 
  (0.075) (0.026) 
∆logCapital Share  0.379*** -0.405*** 
  (0.085) (0.030) 
∆logMaterials Prices  0.017 -0.061 
  (0.183) (0.064) 
∆logScale  -0.077* 0.103*** 
  (0.045) (0.016) 
∆logUpstream TFP  0.345 0.004 
  (0.377) (0.132) 
Observations 676  676 
R
2 0.041  0.289 
Adjusted R
2 0.034  0.283 
Shea’s partial R
2 0.002  0.014 
F statistic  85.09  58.11 
Wald test p-val 
a 0.000  0.000 
F statistic for excluded instruments  6.80  155.58 
Wald test p-val excluded instruments 
b 0.000  0.000 
Notes: (1) Standard errors are in parentheses. (2) *, **, and *** indicate significance at a 10%, 5%, and 1% 
level, respectively. (3) These first stage regressions refer to the main first-differenced tariff specification in 
column 1 of Table 6. (4) The dependent variables are indicated in the header row of each column.  
a Wald test p-val provides the probability value for the F-test of H0: The instruments are jointly 
insignificant. 





















TABLE 14. Tariffs and Productivity: A System of Equations 
 
 OLS      3SLS   
 logAit  logAit logτit log(Qit/Mitεit) 
logτit -0.066***    -0.067***    1.869*** 
 (0.022)    (0.021)    (0.107) 
log(Qit/Mitεit)      0.362***  
       (0.096)   
logAit       0.198***   
       (0.057)   
logCapital Share       1.038*** 
        (0.082) 
logMaterials Prices       1.041*** 
        (0.241) 
logScale  0.246***  0.245***     
  (0.029)  (0.014)     
logUpstream TFP  0.260***  0.257***     
  (0.092)  (0.096)     
Constant  -1.842***  -1.828***  -1.612*** 5.227*** 
 (0.321)    (0.219)  (0.229)  (0.239) 
Observations 920    920  920  920 
R
2 0.812    0.812  0.770  0.338 
Wald test p-val  0.000    0.000  0.000  0.000 
Notes: (1) Standard errors are in parentheses. (2) *, **, and *** indicate significance at a 10%, 5%, and 1% 
level, respectively. (3) The dependent variables are indicated in the header row of each column. (4) The  
logAit equations include industry dummies, GDP growth, and inflation as controls which are not reported 
here. The logτit equation includes both industry and year dummies which are not reported. 






















TABLE 15. Effective Rates of Protection and Productivity: A System of Equations 
 
 OLS      3SLS   
 logAit  logAit logτit
eff log(Qit/Mitεit) 
logτit
eff -0.059***    -0.069***    1.513*** 
 (0.022)    (0.020)    (0.080) 
log(Qit/Mitεit)      0.468***  
       (0.127)   
logAit       0.320***   
       (0.074)   
logCapital Share       1.074*** 
        (0.082) 
logMaterials Prices       0.966*** 
        (0.239) 
logScale  0.247***  0.247***     
  (0.029)  (0.014)     
logUpstream TFP  0.265***   0.247**     
  (0.092)  (0.098)     
Constant  -1.767***  -1.729***  -0.545*  3.906*** 
 (0.332)    (0.229)  (0.302)  (0.183) 
Observations 887    887  887  887 
R
2 0.809    0.809  0.756  0.363 
Wald test p-val  0.000    0.000  0.000  0.000 
Notes: (1) Standard errors are in parentheses. (2) *, **, and *** indicate significance at a 10%, 5%, and 1% 
level, respectively. (3) The dependent variables are indicated in the header row of each column. (4) The  
logAit equations include industry dummies, GDP growth, and inflation as controls which are not reported 
here. The logτit
eff equation includes both industry and year dummies which are not reported. 
a Wald test p-val provides the probability value for the Chi-squared-test of H0: The regressors are jointly 
insignificant. 
 